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One Parcel Plus One Parcel
Equals a “Parcel as a Whole”
Murr v. Wisconsin’s Fluid Calculations for Regulatory Takings
By Shelby D. Green

Composition A by Piet Mondrian Galleria Nazionale d’Arte Moderna e Contemporanea

T

he Court’s most recent major
property law case, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017),
tackles one of the thorny, recurring issues in regulatory takings
jurisprudence: what is the proper
“denominator” to use in determining
whether a government regulation has
so greatly diminished the economic
value of a parcel of land that it effects
a taking? More speciically, Murr
looked at what constitutes the “parcel
as a whole” when a landowner holds
title to two contiguous lots. Should a
court assess the economic impact on
the value of each lot separately or the
impact on the value of the two lots
together? In answering that question,
the Court added another multi-factored test to the already complex web
of regulatory takings law.
Development of Regulatory
Takings Jurisprudence
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978),
the Supreme Court upheld the application of New York City’s landmarks
Shelby D. Green is a professor of law at
the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace
University in White Plains, New York, and
the editor of “Keeping Current—Property”
for Probate & Property.

preservation law, spoiling the owner’s plans to construct an ofice tower
atop the elegant Beaux Art Grand
Central Terminal. The owner asserted
that because 100% of its right to build
atop the terminal (its air rights) was
barred by the ordinance, there was
a taking of property requiring compensation. But the Supreme Court
conceived the burdens from the ordinance differently, looking at the
whole parcel, including the existing
building. The Court explained:
“Taking” jurisprudence does not
divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to
determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been
entirely abrogated. In deciding
whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking,
this Court focuses rather both
on the character of the action
and on the nature and extent of
the interference with rights in
the parcel as a whole—here, the
city tax block designated as the
“landmark site.”
Id. at 130–31 (emphasis added). In
fact, the land underneath the Penn
Central operations comprised six lots,
although the site for the proposed

Published in Probate & Property, Volume 32, No 1 © 2018 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission.
All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or
stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

tower rested on only one legally
deined lot.
Takings jurisprudence derives
from the Fifth Amendment (private
property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation”).
Since 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), the clause
has been read to apply not only to the
government’s direct appropriation of
property or its functional equivalent
(like permanent looding) but also to
the burdensome effects of land use
regulations. The Court allowed that
“property may be regulated to a certain extent,” but pronounced that “if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Id. at 415. In
elucidating that point, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes offered little more
than his characteristic poetry:
Government hardly could go on
if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law.
As long recognized some values
are enjoyed under an implied
limitation and must yield to the
police power. But obviously the
implied limitation must have its
limits or the contract and due
process clauses are gone.
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Id. at 413. The Court went on to
reverse a lower court ruling on a statute that forbade the mining of coal
in such a way as to cause the subsidence of structures used for human
habitation.
In Penn Central, the Court articulated the now-prevailing test for
regulatory takings, one that had been
developing in the years after Pennsylvania Coal. Though in the guise of
a mathematical equation, there was
no “set formula,” the test lacked certainty in the calculation and result
and offered little guidance for staying
clear of Justice Holmes’s line. Instead,
the three-part calculus embraces multiple variables and luid measures. Id.
Under the Penn Central ad hoc test,
when a regulation impedes the use
of property without depriving the
owner of all economically beneicial
use, a taking may be found based on
several factors, including (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant, (2) the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations, and
(3) the character of the governmental
action. 438 U.S. at 124.
Years later, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992), the Court recognized that
some regulations may overwhelm
all of the fruits of ownership. In the
“extraordinary circumstance when no
productive or economically beneicial use of land is permitted,” there is
a categorical taking. Id. at 1017, 1019.
This exception to the Penn Central ad
hoc test is made only when the burden of the regulation is complete.
This means that if “the diminution
in value is 95% instead of 100%,” the
categorical takings claim fails and the
takings analysis focuses on the three
Penn Central factors. Tahoe-Sierra Pres.
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002).
The Court took the opportunity to
extend its regulatory takings jurisprudence in Murr. More than a century
after the advent of regulatory takings
jurisprudence, the Court admitted
that it still has not crafted deinitive

In    , the
Court articulated the
now prevailing test
for regulatory takings,
one that had been
developing in the
years after
     .

rules to guide this area of takings
law. 137 S. Ct. at 1942. The Court did
not undertake to square up the entire
analysis in Murr, but only to give
some direction for one part of the
test—the “parcel as a whole” component. Whether the additions portend
greater ease of analysis is not certain.
The Lands of the Murrs and
the Regulatory Limits
Under the Penn Central analysis of the
economic impact of a regulation, the
ultimate question is what portion of
the property’s value the challenged
action depresses; the greater the portion, the more likely it may be found
to be a taking. In Penn Central, the
property owner contended that 100%
of its air rights were taken. But a
majority of the Court found that air
rights were not the proper denominator; instead, the Court considered air
rights to be only part of the “parcel as
a whole.” 438 U.S. at 131. Murr presented the denominator question in
the context of a landowner who holds
contiguous lots.
The Murrs’ parents acquired Lot
F in 1960 (later transferring ownership to a family plumbing business)
and the adjacent Lot E, which they
held in their own names, in 1963.
They built a three-bedroom cabin on
Lot F and used Lot E for parking, volleyball, and general recreation. The

topography of the lots is rough and
rugged with a steep bluff that cuts
through the middle of each; the only
level land suitable for development
is that above the bluff and next to the
water below it. Id. at 1940. Although
each lot is approximately 1.25 acres,
because of the geography, less than
one acre of each lot is suitable for
development and, even when combined, the buildable area of the lots is
only 0.98 acres. Id.
The parents transferred title to the
two lots to their children on different dates: Lot F in 1994 and Lot E in
1995. The lots were within an area
long-admired for its “picturesque
grandeur,” the St. Croix River scenic area. Id. at 1939–40. The beauty
of the area was preserved under the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C
§ 1274(a)(6), (9), which required the
states of Wisconsin and Minnesota to
develop “a management and development program” for the river area.
41 Fed. Reg. 26,237. Accordingly, Wisconsin enacted the amendments to its
administrative code that created the
conundrum for the Murrs. First, legal
lots were required to have at least one
acre of land suitable for development.
Wis. Admin. Code §§ NR 118.04(4),
118.03(27), 118.06(1)(a)(2)(a), 118.06(1)(b).
A grandfather clause, however,
relaxed this restriction for substandard
lots that were “in separate ownership from abutting lands” on January
1, 1976, the effective date of the regulation, and permitted the use of
qualifying lots as separate building
sites. Wis. Admin. Code § NR 118.08(4)
(a)(1). Nevertheless, adjacent lots that
came under common ownership were
merged and could not be “sold or
developed as separate lots” if they did
not meet the size requirement (“the
merger provision”). Wis. Admin.
Code § NR 118.08(4)(a)(2). The county
zoning ordinance contained identical restrictions. St. Croix County, Wis.,
Ord. § 17.36I.4.a. As is typical, the
rules provided for variances in case of
“unnecessary hardship.” Wis. Admin.
Code § NR 118.09(4)(b); St. Croix
County Ord. § 17.09.232.
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A decade after the transfer from
their parents, the Murrs sought to
relocate the cabin to a different portion of Lot F and to sell Lot E to
obtain the funds for their plan. Much
to their frustration, the transfer of the
lots from their parents triggered the
merger provision, which barred separate sale or development. The Murrs
could sell or build only on the single
larger lot, but not on Lot E separately.
Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941. Their request
for a variance to sell Lot E was
denied; the county suggested alternative uses—preserving the existing
cabin on Lot F, or tearing down the
cabin and building a new one on Lot
E, on Lot F, or across both lots. Id. at
1941.
Finding none of the alternatives
acceptable, the Murrs brought a regulatory takings claim in state court.
In the challenge, they maintained
that the value of Lot E, if sold as an
unbuildable lot, was $40,000 but was
approximately $400,000 if sold without any restrictions; and that the
value of Lots E and F, if sold together
and with restrictions, was $698,300
but was $771,000 if sold separately
without restrictions. Id. at 1941. The
trial court found the Murrs had the
options for the use and enjoyment
of their property as suggested by the
county when it denied the variance.
It also found that the Murrs had not
been deprived of all economic value
in their property. And, viewing the
two lots as a single parcel, the court
determined that the decrease in market value was less than 10%, not a
signiicant economic impact.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals
afirmed, declining to analyze the
effect of the regulation on Lot E
alone. Instead, it ruled that the takings analysis “properly focused” on
the regulations’ effect on the Murrs’
property as a whole—Lots E and
F together. Id. This was so because
the Murrs could not reasonably
have expected to use the lots separately because they were charged
with knowledge of the regulations
when they acquired the property.

Any expectation to use the lots differently became unreasonable when
they chose to acquire Lot E in 1995,
after having acquired Lot F in 1994,
triggering the merger provisions. Id.
at 1942. The court of appeals agreed
with the trial court that the economic impact from the regulation
was minimal—only a 10% decline in
value. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
declined review and the matter came
before the Supreme Court on petition
for certiorari. The Court agreed with
the state.
Parcel as a Whole
The Murrs did not contend that the
Wisconsin rules deprived them of
all the value of their land so as to
make out a Lucas categorical taking
(the lots could still be used as they
always had been). Instead, they contended that because Lot E could not
be alienated or developed as a separate parcel, there was a taking, subject
to the Penn Central ad hoc test. Their
claim was about the parcel as a whole
component—the “denominator question.” If the correct denominator was
Lot E, then there was either a 90% or
100% loss, very likely a taking requiring compensation; but if it was Lots
E and F as one parcel, then there was
only a 10% loss, unlikely a suficient
effect on value to establish a taking.

From the irst
regulatory takings
case, the Court’s
treatment of the
“parcel as a whole”
concept has been itful.

Published in Probate & Property, Volume 32, No 1 © 2018 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission.
All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or
stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

From the irst regulatory takings
case, the Court’s treatment of the
“parcel as a whole” concept has been
itful—some cases adopting it, if only
sub silentio, others casting doubt on
it, and yet others squarely adopting
it and in novel contexts. Arguably, in
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 393, the
Court treated just that part affected
by the statute—the “support estate,”
that is, the right to remove the strata
of coal and earth that undergird the
surface or instead to leave those layers intact to support the surface and
prevent subsidence, as the denominator. But, in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987), the Court viewed the support estate as an inextricable part of
the mineral estate or surface estate,
stating that it could not be used profitably by one who does not also
possess either the mineral estate or
the surface estate. Id. at 498. Because
the support estate has value only
insofar as it protects or enhances the
value of the estate with which it is
associated, the interests should be
considered as one parcel. Id.
In Lucas, Justice Scalia found that
although the proper factors for determining the denominator were unclear,
the position taken by the state court
in Penn Central (that is, to consider
all of Penn Central’s property in the
area) was “extreme . . . and unsupportable.” 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. He
suggested examining state property
law as to “how the owner’s reasonable
expectations have been shaped by the
State’s law of property, i.e., whether
and to what degree the State’s law has
accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest.” Id.
Then, in Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602 (1993), the Court
explained that “[t]o the extent that
any portion of property is taken, that
portion is always taken in its entirety;
the relevant question, however, is
whether the property taken is all, or
only a portion of, the parcel in question.” Id. at 644.
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Multi-Factor Test:
Gaps, Leaps, and Offsets

Why logically does one
parcel plus one parcel
equal “a parcel as a whole”
and not two parcels for
purposes of the regulatory
takings analysis?

In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606 (2001), a plurality of the Court
granted that some cases endorse the
parcel-as-a-whole rule but confessed
that “we have at times expressed discomfort” with it. Id. at 631. There, the
landowner claimed his upland parcel was distinct from the regulated
wetlands portions, so he should be
permitted to assert a deprivation limited to the latter; but the point was
not pressed in state courts, nor raised
in the petition to the Court, and as
such, the framed total deprivation
argument failed. Id. at 632.
In Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535
U.S. at 302, the Court ruled that a
moratorium that precluded all development for three years was not a total
taking inasmuch as, when the moratorium ended, the landowners could
once again enjoy all the attributes of
a fee simple absolute title. The Court
stated that it is the effect on the parcel
as a whole, that is, the whole fee simple, in relation to the entire life of the
property, that is relevant. Id. at 331–
32. “An interest in real property is
deined by the metes and bounds that
describe its geographic dimensions
and the term of years that describes
the temporal aspect of the owner’s
interest. . . . Both dimensions must
be considered if the interest is to be
viewed in its entirety.” Id. at 332.

Why logically does one parcel plus
one parcel equal “a parcel as a whole”
and not two parcels for purposes
of the regulatory takings analysis? In Murr, rather than applying
the term “lot” or “parcel” literally,
looking to the geographical or legal
demarcations of the land to determine the relevant denominator, the
Court adopted a “takings-speciic”
meaning, one that is found under
a multi-factor test. The stated aim
is to determine whether reasonable
expectations about property ownership would lead a landowner to
anticipate that his holdings would
be treated as one parcel, or, instead,
as separate tracts. 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
The starting factor is the treatment
of the land under state and local law.
On this point the Court stated that an
acquirer of land must acknowledge
“legitimate restrictions affecting his
or her subsequent use and disposition of the property,” but it cautioned
that those limits that are triggered
only after a change in ownership may
present a different case. Id. at 1945.
A second factor focuses on the
physical characteristics of the land,
including the relationship of any distinguishable tracts, its topography,
and the surrounding human and
ecological environment, to determine, among other things, whether
the property is in an area that is subject to, or likely to become subject to,
environmental or other regulation. Id.
at 1945–46. In this regard, an acquirer
might expect prospective regulations to protect and preserve the land,
rather than the state simply addressing degradations under nuisance law.
The third factor instructs courts to
assess the positive effects of the regulation, not only on the land directly
affected by the regulation, but on
adjacent, remaining land. Although a
use restriction may decrease the market value of the property, that effect
may be tempered if the regulated
land adds value to the remaining property, such as by protecting

views and allowing the expansion of
a structure—beneits that counsel in
favor of treatment of multiple parcels
as a single one. Id. at 1946.
All of those factors resolved
against the Murrs. The state limits
on sale and development of substandard lots were in place at the time the
Murrs acquired ownership. It was
their “voluntary conduct” in bringing
the lots into common ownership after
the regulations were enacted that subjected them to those limits—the valid
merger provision under state law
informed the expectations and forecast the treatment of the two lots as
a single property. Id. at 1948. It does
not seem to matter that the grandfather provisions in the regulations
preserved the legal deinitions of the
parcels and would have allowed the
separate sale and development of Lot
E by the parents. These rights did not
extend to their transferees.
The Court noted that the lots were
contiguous and situated in an area
of remarkable natural beauty; their
physical coniguration and topography made building on them as
separate lots challenging to say the
least. Id. at 1940. It is unclear whether
the Court would have reached a different conclusion on this fact had it
considered other land use tools for
protecting the character of the land,
such as limits on the type, size, and
location of structures on the lots, or
that the original lot lines might have
been driven by the same rugged
topography.
The Court went on to ind that
“[t]he value added by the lots’ combination shows their complementarity
and supports their treatment as one
parcel.” Id. at 1949. Accepting that
the regulation diminished the value
of Lot E, that diminution was offset
by the increase in value to the two
lots as combined: the combined lots
were valued at $698,300, far greater
than the total value of the separate
regulated lots (Lot F with its cabin
at $373,000, according to the state’s
appraiser, and Lot E as an undevelopable plot at $40,000, according to
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the Murrs’ appraiser). On this point,
the Court clearly afirmed the longheld notion that effects of land use
regulations are both positive and negative. Because the Murrs had used
Lot E to serve Lot F, Lot E having
no separate purposes, their merger,
which produced an increase in total
value, might seem unobjectionable,
except that by doing so, the Murrs are
largely foreclosed from putting Lot
E to different purposes and denied
the opportunity to realize its separate
economic value.
Outcome-Determinative
Treating the two lots as one seemed
outcome-determinative; it reduced
the regulatory impact from 100% of
one lot to 10% of two lots, meaning
not likely severe enough to require
compensation and rendering the
other elements of the takings test
largely irrelevant. But the multi-factor
test adopted was less outcome-determinative than would have been the
bright-line rules offered by both sides
in the case. Rejecting a ixed meaning,
the Court stated that it must deine
“parcel” in a manner that relects
reasonable expectations about the
property. Id. at 1950.
The state of Wisconsin urged that
the deinition of the relevant parcel
should be tied to state law, considering the two lots as a single whole
as a result of their merger under the
challenged regulations. But this position would tend too much to the state
and create the risk that a state might
“deine the relevant parcel in a way
that permits it to escape its responsibility to justify regulation in light of
legitimate property expectations.” Id.
at 1946.
In contrast, the Murrs insisted
that the boundary lot lines should
determine the relevant parcel. This
proposition ignored that lot lines
were creatures of state law, which
can be overridden by the state in reasonable exercise of its powers. The
assertion also tended too far to one
side, ignoring the well-settled reliance
on merger provisions as a common

means of achieving legitimate ends,
such as preserving open space while
allowing orderly development, their
harshness often ameliorated through
variances. Id. at 1947. See, e.g., Ness
v. County of Crow Wing, No. A061690, 2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS
1202 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2007)
(upholding merger provisions for
valid land use purposes).
Radical Inventions?
Although the dissent criticized the
majority for incorporating new layers in the analysis that serve only to
increase opacity, the dissent in turn
did not acknowledge that a number of lower federal courts already
had colored the analysis by introducing lexible variables toward a more
nuanced determination of the relevant parcel. See Loveladies Harbor,
Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[o]ur precedent displays a lexible approach, designed
to account for factual nuances”). For
those courts, the intuitive starting
point was whether the parcels are
contiguous property and held by the
same owner at the time the taking
occurred. In Forest Properties, Inc. v.
United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 951 (1999),
contiguous parcels, although one submerged and another above ground,
were treated as a whole. But, in Palm
Beach Isles Associates v. United States,
208 F.3d 1374, 1381, aff’d on rehearing, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
because 50 acres of a larger 261-acre
parcel were situated across the road
and physically remote, they were
treated as separate.
Contiguity alone is insuficient
because the courts also consider
other practical and economic conditions linking the parcels, such as time
of purchase and common inancing.
See Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl.
Ct. 310, 321 (1991) (owner treated the
lots as a single parcel for purposes of
purchase and inancing, which were
inextricably linked). Parcels included
in the same development plan or held
by the owner as a single economic
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unit also may be treated as one. In
Lost Tree Village Corp. v. United States,
707 F.3d 1286, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2013),
aff’d, 787 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2325 (2017),
the relevant parcel did not include
a nearby developed lot because the
landowner did not treat them as part
of the same “economic unit.” See also
Palm Beach Isles Assocs., 208 F.3d at
1381 (development of one parcel was
physically and temporally remote
from, and legally unconnected to,
the other; combining the two simply
because at one time they were under
common ownership cannot be justiied); Loveladies Harbor, Inc., 28 F.3d at
1181 (contiguous land developed and
sold before enactment of regulation
treated as separate parcel). But see
Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081,
1091 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (the landowners “regarded the 2280-acre parcel as
a single economic unit”); Appolo Fuels,
Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338,
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 1188, (2005) (contiguous leases
were part of “one uniied mining
plan”).
State courts also have gone
beyond legal deinitions of a parcel

State courts have gone
beyond legal deinitions
of a parcel in deining
the relevant parcel,
inding that contiguous
parcels under common
ownership may be
treated as one.
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in deining the relevant parcel, inding that contiguous parcels under
common ownership may be treated
as one. See Giovanella v. Conservation
Comm’n of Ashland, 857 N.E.2d 451
(Mass. 2006) (contiguous lots with
same uses and zoning); K & K Const.,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Natural Resources, 575
N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 819 (1998) (three contiguous
parcels under common ownership);
Bevan v. Brandon Twp., 475 N.W.2d 37,
amended, 439 Mich. 1202 (1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1060 (1992) (contiguous lots under common ownership);
Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d
528 (Wis. 1996) (separately-zoned
parts of 10.4 contiguous acres constituted the denominator).
At the same time, noncontiguous
parcels are more likely to be treated
as separate property by state courts.
In East Cape May Assoc. v. New Jersey, 777 A.2d 1015 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 2001), the court applied a set of
ten nonexclusive factual questions
and concluded that noncontiguous,
separately purchased, and separately
zoned and developed tracts were separate parcels.
Just as in the federal courts, state
courts have treated otherwise separate parcels held by their owners
as part of the same economic unit
or development plan as one for
purposes of determining the denominator. Giovanella, 857 N.E.2d at 460–61
(contiguous parcels, purchased at
the same time and intended for same
development); K & K Const., 575
N.W.2d at 581 (parcels connected
through a proposed development
scheme and permit applications);
Chapman v. Conservation Comm’n, 987
N.E.2d 619 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013)(subdivision consisting of 140 lots was the
relevant parcel, not just the two lots
burdened); Dunes West Golf Club, LLC
v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 737 S.E.2d
601, 615–18 (S.C. 2013) (including all
256 acres of the golf course property
and not just the discrete portion subject to the development for residential
use); FIC Homes of Blackstone, Inc. v.
Conservation Comm’n of Blackstone, 673
N.E.2d 61 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (lots

Perhaps the only thing
that is clear from 
is that the regulatory
takings doctrine is a
shape-shifting thing.

purchased within same subdivision
on same date).
A Shape-Shifting Thing
Perhaps the only thing that is clear
from Murr is that the regulatory takings doctrine is a shape-shifting
thing—evolving and lexing, inding form in the context to which it
is applied, and the inventions introduced there are not certain to make
the lines more deinite and results
more admired.
Property is said to be a legal construct, with signiicance in terms
of rights and limits on those rights
and protections against intrusions
on those rights. Before Murr, fairly
settled conventions determined the
thing to which the laws of property applied—legal descriptions as
manifested on the ground—and this
remains so for most purposes. But
now, will a state or local government
be able to preempt or circumvent takings challenges, simply by how it,
even from a post hoc perspective,
characterizes or deines the physical
dimensions of property? The “takings-speciic” meaning of property, to
be applied irst to determine whether
there is property and second to determine whether there has been a taking,
as the dissent in Murr maintained,
will almost always portend this
result. The multi-factor test adopted

in Murr and being used in the lower
courts for deining the parcel seems
only to describe what a state has done
but does not otherwise constrain
what it can do. In other words, just
because two lots can nominally be
regarded as one parcel for purposes
of the state’s land use policies does
not mean the decision to merge them
should be beyond the Court’s scrutiny as a taking or that they should be
regarded as one for purposes of regulatory takings analysis.
In evaluating the parcel-as-awhole concept, it seems important to
bear in mind what the concept originally aimed to do—prevent an owner
from identifying a single thread in
his bundle of ownership rights and
claim a taking. As Chief Justice Roberts asserts in his dissent, there is
no risk of single-thread selection by
giving regard to the boundary lines
between parcels already drawn by the
states. 137 S. Ct. at 1953. As it is now
deined, not only does the “parcel as
a whole” concept not reveal or assess
the severity of the economic impact
from regulation, but also it may operate to mask it. n
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